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I. INTRODUCTION
California was at the forefront of medicinal cannabis legalization
in 1996.1 That was twenty years ago. Today, twenty-three states,
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of Columbia have all passed
laws legalizing the use of cannabis for medical purposes.2 Three of
these states plus the District of Columbia have also legalized the recreational use of cannabis.3 However, despite the aggregate of state
protections and changing public opinion, both medical and recreational use of cannabis remains illegal under federal law.4 This underlying conflict between state and federal law creates significant uncertainty for cannabis businesses and their employees.

 J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2016; B.A. Communication, University of Maryland, College Park, 2011. I want to thank Professor Mary Ziegler for
providing insight into federal labor law, and for her invaluable help throughout t he process. I am also grateful for the love and support of my family throughout my academic
endeavors.
1. 23
Legal
Medical
Marijuana
States
and
DC,
PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2016).
2. Id.; Puerto Rico Governor Signs Order to Legalize Medical Marijuana,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/04/
puerto-rico-medical-marijuana_n_7203916.html; State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuanalaws.aspx (last updated Jan. 25, 2016).
3. State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 2.
4. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)-(c), 829 (2012). Under the Controlled Substances Act, cannabis is classified as a Schedule I controlled substance. § 812(c).
This is the most restrictive category and signifies Congress’s conclusion that cannabis has
no medicinal value and cannot be legally prescribed. See id. § 812(b); see also Racketeer
Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012).
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Since the advent of state-authorized medicinal cannabis, scholars
have thoroughly explored the employment law issues raised by legalization.5 This discussion concerns various topics, ranging from drugfree workplace policies to mandatory drug screening and employment
discrimination. Additionally, employer practices and resulting lawsuits have prompted consideration of the legal ramifications of employees using cannabis.6 However, current literature does not adequately address how state and federal law may regulate employment
within the industry itself given the prevailing federal criminal prohibitions still governing cannabis.7 This unique situation has left one
federal agency to regulate an industry that another is tasked with
eliminating.
Recently, due to the expanding nature of the cannabis industry,
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) has
agreed to hear multiple labor cases involving claims that cannabis
employers engaged in unfair labor practices. The federal Office of
General Counsel of the NLRB released an Advice Memorandum
(“Memo”) recommending what this Note terms the “Wellness Approach”8—reasoning that the NLRB should exercise jurisdiction to
investigate unfair labor practice claims against cannabis enterprises.9 This Note offers the first meaningful analysis of the NLRB’s proposed approach, evaluating whether extending the protections of the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) to cover the cannabis industry is feasible as a matter of statutory interpretation or
policy.

5. See generally Jay S. Becker & Saranne E. Weimer, Legalization of Marijuana
Raises Significant Questions and Issues for Employers, N.J. LAW., Dec. 2014, at 66; Matthew D. Macy, Employment Law and Medical Marijuana—An Uncertain Relationship,
COLO. LAW., Jan. 2012, at 57; Michael D. Moberly & Charitie L. Hartsig, Smoke – and Mirrors? Employers and the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, ARIZ. ATT’Y, July/Aug. 2011,
at 30.
6. See Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 2008) (upholding the
right of the employer to terminate its employee, a qualified medical cannabis patient, after
he failed a drug screening); see also Len Iwanski, Medical Marijuana Law Doesn’t Protect
Workers, MISSOULIAN (Apr. 4, 2009), http://www.missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/
article_2f5ef0f7-fab3-50fe-8f48-914c716fd23a.html (“In July 2006, Mike Johnson tested
positive for marijuana in a random drug test. The company said the 25-year employee
could return to work if he submitted to additional drug tests and passed them. He refused
and was fired.”).
7. See Elizabeth Rodd, Light, Smoke, and Fire: How State Law Can Provide Medical
Marijuana Users Protection from Workplace Discrimination, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1759 (2014).
8. This Note’s argument that the Board should exert jurisdiction will be referred to
as the “Wellness Approach” because the NLRB Memo is not law, nor is it binding on the
Board.
9. Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel Div. of Advice,
NLRB, to Jonathan B. Kreisberg, Reg’l Dir. Region 1 (Oct. 25, 2013) [hereinafter NLRB Memorandum], http://www.managementmemo.com/files/2014/08/01_CA_104979_10_25_13_.pdf.
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Ultimately, this Note argues that the NLRB should exercise jurisdiction because cannabis legalization will continue to expand at the
state level,10 allowing more citizens to be employed in an industry
where workers’ rights remain unclear. While Congress continues to
leave major questions facing the cannabis industry unanswered, the
Board will serve as a vehicle to address interstitial labor issues. The
Board’s decision will not only validate the nascent cannabis industry,
but it will also help expose dormant labor conflicts. Cannabis industry employees deserve the same labor rights guaranteed to all other
workers in the American economy under the NLRA.11
This Note proceeds in four parts: Part II discusses the background
of the cannabis industry as well as the gap in state and federal law
protecting employees in the industry. Part III examines the mechanics of the NLRA, the jurisdictional bounds of the Board, and the recent NLRB Memo, which suggested jurisdiction. Part IV explores the
Wellness Approach, applying it in the context of the law on unfair
labor practices under the NLRA. Additionally, Part IV argues that
the NLRB should apply the Wellness Approach and bring employees
of the cannabis industry under the protection of federal labor law.
Part V addresses the core challenges that will likely arise in applying
labor law to the cannabis industry. This Note will conclude by proposing various ways the NLRB can improve labor law jurisprudence
in the fledging American cannabis industry.
II. AN INDUSTRY CLOUDED UNDER SMOKE
Ian Brodie quit his job at Wellness Connection, a company that
operates multiple marijuana-growing facilities and dispensaries, due
to his frustration with company management and their failure to address widespread employee grievances.12 Brodie, along with other coworkers, also suffered illnesses stemming from working in a facility
with pesticides and mold.13 When employees expressed their grievances through legally protected organizing, they were issued disciplinary warnings, unlawfully interrogated, and made to believe that
any union activities were under surveillance.14 The employer’s
10. Cannabis sales are estimated to hit $3.1–3.6 billion in total revenue by 2016. See
Chris Walsh, US Medical Marijuana Sales to Hit $1.5B in 2013, Cannabis Revenues Could
Quadruple by 2018, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Mar. 21, 2013), https://mmjbusinessdaily.com/
us-medical-marijuana-sales-estimated-at-1-5b-in-2013-cannabis-industry-could-quadrupleby-2018.
11. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
12. Dave Jamieson, Medical Marijuana Workers Have the Same Labor Rights
As Everyone Else, Feds Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2014, 5:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/27/medical-marijuana-unions_n_4860793.html.
13. See id.
14. Id.
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retaliatory actions were in direct violation of federal labor laws.15
Employees in any other industry would be protected and could seek
relief under multiple federal laws; but, since this company produces,
cultivates, and dispenses cannabis, it is stuck in a gray area as to
whether it should be considered within the scope of federal jurisdiction. If it is, this would mean that federal laws administered by the
U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”), such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the NLRA, among many others, have
not been adequately enforced within the cannabis industry.16
The issues raised by Mr. Brodie’s case and others like it have received little attention from the courts, scholars, or policymakers.
With some states providing legal access to medical marijuana, commentators have debated the protections that should be available to
workers prescribed to use cannabis. As the Brodie situation makes
clear, however, current discussion has mostly missed an equally important issue—the rights of workers in the cannabis industry itself.
The Brodie example follows a pattern seen in a troubling number of
cases—cannabis workers being taken advantage of due to the lack of
federal oversight.17 Brodie’s case highlights the implications of the
inconsistency between state and federal cannabis laws—an inconsistency causing increasing uncertainty regarding the rights of employees who work for state-sanctioned dispensing organizations. Although states have passed marijuana legislation to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens, the lack of federal oversight may
lead to serious abuse of employees.18 Section II.A explores the nature
of the emerging cannabis industry, illuminating how and why it
leaves employees open to exploitation.
A. The American Cannabis Industry
The cannabis sativa plant and its derivative products are classified as a Schedule I narcotic under the Controlled Substances Act of
15. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-159 (2012).
16. See generally Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621634 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-159 (providing federal oversight mechanisms for employees
covered under the Act); Jamieson, supra note 12; see also Hilary Bricken, Marijuana Workers
and Unions: The 4-1-1, CANNA LAW BLOG (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.cannalawblog.com/
marijuana-workers-and-unions-the-4-1-1/; Jan Hefler, Growing Pains: Labor Strife at N.J.’s
First
Medical
Marijuana
Dispensary,
PHILLY. COM
(Jan.
30,
2015),
http://articles.philly.com/2015-01-30/news/58591595_1_marijuana-dispensary-marijuanaindustry-marijuana-regulations.
18. See Michael Hiltzik, How We Know Marijuana Industry Is Maturing: Unfair Labor Practice Complaints, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/
hiltzik/la-fi-mh-marijuana-industry-unfair-labor-complaints-20150317-column.html.
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1970 (“CSA”).19 Although the CSA prohibits the possession, cultivation, and distribution of cannabis,20 twenty-three states, Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the District of Columbia have all established rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative enactments that legalize some variation of its use.21 The states that allow the production, sale, and use of cannabis have created a budding industry, estimated to be worth $1.5 billion in revenue.22 By 2018, industry revenue is predicted to grow to $6 billion.23 Due to federal laws banning
medical cannabis, the regulation of the industry is left primarily to
each respective state.24
As the use of medical cannabis gains public approval, the rights of
workers in the industry will remain cloudy and complicated by regulatory inconsistencies and ambiguities.25 The legal responsibilities of
cannabis enterprises differ from companies that are regulated by federal law. Yet, on the state level, each state that has legalized cannabis has established its own regulations.26 States with legalized cannabis enforce comprehensive regulations to ensure safety, privacy,
and accountability within the industry. For example, among many
other requirements, California requires all medical cannabis dispensaries that apply pesticides to their harvest to obtain an operator
identification number from the County Agricultural Commissioner.27
These dispensaries must continue to send the pesticide use reports
on a monthly basis to the Commissioner’s office.28 Maine also imposes
significant regulations after the state passed the Maine Medical Use

19. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1249 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The CSA
constitutes Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention and Control
Act., § 100, 84 Stat. at 1242. The CSA provides a statutory framework for the federal government to regulate the lawful production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances. See §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. at 1242-84.
20. See §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. at 1242-84.
21. 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 1; Puerto Rico Governor
Signs Order to Legalize Medical Marijuana, supra note 2.
22. Walsh, supra note 10.
23. Jon C. Ogg, Estimated $10 Billion Marijuana Sales in 2015 Far Too Low, 24/7
WALL ST. (May 23, 2015, 9:20 AM), http://247wallst.com/consumer-products/2015/05/23/
estimated-10-billion-marijuana-business-sales-in-2015-far-too-low/.
24. See Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 5 n.1 (2013) (citing state statutes governing marijuana).
25. See Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 787
(2004).
26. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 453A.502 (2014) (showing that Nevada state law
requires cannabis cultivation facilities to strictly label each of its products).
27. Pesticide Use on Marijuana, DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REG., http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/
water_issues/programs/enforcement/docs/cannabis_enfrcmnt/pesticide_use_on_marijuana.pdf
(last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
28. Id.
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of Marijuana Act in 2009.29 The Act delegated authority to Maine’s
Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) as the principle agency to regulate the state’s new medical marijuana industry.30
The DHHS published a comprehensive set of rules, including, among
other requirements, that all medical cannabis employees secure a
registry identification card from DHHS before affiliating or working
at any state dispensary.31 During the mandated application process,
each medical cannabis employee must also pass a background check
conducted by DHHS.32 Moreover, cannabis dispensaries are required
to have written employment contract policies, procedures, and job
descriptions; to contract with approved employee assistance programs; and, to maintain an alcohol and drug-free workplace policy.33
Furthermore, as public opinion and laws have evolved nationwide,
the federal government has, in rare cases, recognized aspects of the
industry by enforcing a limited but growing number of federal regulations. For instance, financial institutions working with statesanctioned cannabis businesses are now required to file a Marijuana
Limited Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) with federal authorities.34
The SAR discloses whether the business is following the government’s guidelines with regard to revenue derived exclusively from
legal sales.35 Additionally, in May 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to protect states with medical cannabis laws from
federal interference.36 Congress emphasized its commitment to such
policy by passing the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 (“Cromnibus Act”). Under this spending bill,
Congress prevented the use of federal funds to prosecute individuals
acting under state-approved medicinal marijuana laws.37
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

ME. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 2421-2430 (2014).
See 10-144-122 ME. CODE R. §§ 1-11 (LexisNexis 2016).
Id. § 8.
Id.
Id. § 6.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2014-G001, BSA
EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES 3 (2014), www.fincen.gov/
statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf.
35. See id.
36. H.R. 4660, 113th Cong. (2014). Representative Rohrabacher (R-CA) offered House
Amendment 748 to the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Bill to prohibit the use of funds to prevent states from implementing their own laws that
authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana. H. Amdt.
748, 113th Cong. (2014). The GOP-controlled House produced a 219-189 vote. Final Vote
Results for Roll Call 258, OFF. OF THE CLERK: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (May 30,
2014), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/roll258.xml; see also Ryan J. Reilly & Matt Ferner,
House Blocks DEA from Targeting Medical Marijuana, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2014,
12:24
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/30/dea-medical-marijuana-housevote_n_5414679.html.
37. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235,
128 Stat. 2130 (2014); see Matt Ferner, Congress Passes Historic Medical Marijuana Protections
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Nonetheless, as long as cannabis remains illegal under the CSA,
state protections for industry workers will be dangerously incomplete. States have no obligation to extend protections to industry
workers and may offer varying levels of protection. As the cannabis
industry expands throughout the states, it will employ a growing,
significant workforce to harvest, process, and sell cannabis and its
derivative products. Therefore, it will become imperative for federal
labor laws to be applied and enforced to protect the industry and its
participants. Part III begins by examining how the National Labor
Relations Act may apply to the cannabis industry. First, Part III develops an account of the purposes of the NLRA and the authority
conventionally exercised by the National Labor Relations Board.
Next, Part III studies the NLRB’s recent analysis of its jurisdiction in
cannabis cases.
III. AMERICAN LABOR LAW
A. The National Labor Relations Act
As state legalization spreads across the United States, an increased demand for cannabis has triggered the creation of larger,
more sophisticated cannabis dispensaries and enterprises.38 One such
enterprise is the California Harborside Health Center, which earned
approximately $20 million in gross revenues in 2008.39 Yet, despite
employing more than seventy-five full-time workers, the Oaklandbased dispensary and its employees are uncertain whether federal
labor laws, such as the NLRA, govern and protect their rights.40
The NLRA is the foundational federal labor law aimed at protecting workers’ rights and balancing employer needs.41 The NLRA guarantees basic rights for private sector employees, including the right
to organize into trade unions and engage in collective bargaining for
better wages.42 The NLRA is designed to “curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the general
welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”43 To implement the policies of the NLRA, sections 153–156 of the Act estabin Spending Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2014, 9:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/12/14/congress-medicalmarijuana_n_6317866.html?utm_hp_ref=tw.
38. See RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND
PROHIBITION POLITICS 61-75 (2004).
39. Angela Woodall, Marijuana Laws Spur Small Businesses in Oakland, Elsewhere,
INSIDE BAY AREA (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.insidebayarea.com/ci_13679216.
40. See id.
41. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
42. Id. § 157.
43. National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nationallabor-relations-act (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
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lished the NLRB to oversee investigations and to remedy unfair labor
practices.44 Congress designed the NLRA to rectify the “inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association.”45
As the principal enforcer of the NLRA, the NLRB was created
to oversee the process by which employees decide whether they want
to be represented by a labor organization and prosecute labor violations.46 The NLRB is authorized to prevent unfair labor practices and
to adjudicate hearings, all of which may be appealed through the
court system.47 To ensure compliance with the Act, the NLRB has
been delegated broad investigatory powers and has the authority to
issue subpoenas, examine evidence, and conduct investigations.48
In many cases, the NLRB clearly has jurisdiction over employers and employees; however, the Act specifically restricts the
Board’s authority over agricultural laborers; supervisors; federal,
state, or local government workers; independent contractors; and
workers covered under the Railway Labor Act.49 In the case of the
cannabis industry, however, the answer is far less obvious. Would
affording employees’ rights under the NLRA impermissibly conflict
with federal drug policy? Should labor law more broadly apply to an
industry considered illegal as a matter of federal law as well as the
laws of many states? Section III.B follows and considers how the
NLRB traditionally exerts jurisdiction and how it may enforce it in
the cannabis realm.
B. The National Labor Relations Board
The Supreme Court has “consistently declared that in passing the
[NLRA], Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the fullest
jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause.”50 Section 2(2) of the NLRA contains language that
“vests jurisdiction in the Board over ‘any’ employer doing business in
this country save those Congress excepted with careful particularity.”51 However, if a labor dispute’s effect on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction, section
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156.
45. Id. § 151.
46. Id. §§ 153, 155.
47. Id. § 160.
48. Id. § 161.
49. Id. § 152; see also Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 74-487, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2012)).
50. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963).
51. India v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 1986); see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
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14(c)(1) of the NLRA provides the Board discretionary authority to
decline jurisdiction.52 Although section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA makes it
clear when the Board cannot decline jurisdiction over a particular
labor dispute,53 there are still many categories that the Board has
traditionally decided not to control.
Throughout its history, the Board has declined to exert jurisdiction over various groups of employers, including charitable organizations, non-profits, small intrastate firms, as well as the horseracing
and dogracing industries.54 The Board would not exercise jurisdiction
because the employers were either “small, local, and did not significantly affect commerce”55 or because the employers were already
heavily regulated by a sovereign state or international entity.56 The
effects of a labor dispute are not the sole reason the Board may unilaterally decide not to exercise jurisdiction. If the employer is based
in an industry characterized by “temporary and sporadic employment,” then the Board has historically not exerted control because of
the significant difficulties in administering the Act in that context. 57
Today, many of the Board’s historical exclusions are limited or
reversed.58 For instance, the Board no longer declines jurisdiction
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012). But see Hirsch v. McCulloch, 303 F.2d 208, 213
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (concluding that the Board’s discretion was not without limit and that the
Board could not, on the basis of advisory opinions, refuse jurisdiction over labor issues
involving categories or groups of employers without first promulgating a rule or holding a
hearing).
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1); Leedom v. Fitch Sanitarium, Inc., 294 F.2d 251, 255-56
(D.C. Cir. 1961) (stating Board standards for jurisdiction existing on August 1, 1959).
54. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see, e.g., Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972) (declining jurisdiction
over a law firm consisting of four to six attorneys where the firm limited the majority of its
practice in Arizona); Horseracing and Dogracing Industries, 38 Fed. Reg. 9537 (Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd. Apr. 16, 1973) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.3) (declining jurisdiction over
horseracing and dogracing industries, in part, because local and state laws decide dates for
tracks’ racing and set a percentage share of the gross wages that would go to the state; the
states licensed employees and retained the right to effect termination to employees whose
activities put at risk the integrity of the industry; and a “unique and special relationship”
existed between these industries and the states because the industries made up a large
source of revenue).
57. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7; see Horseracing and Dogracing Industries, 38 Fed. Reg. at 9537; see also Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., 359
N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 11 (Dec. 14, 2012).
58. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7; see, e.g., Kansas AFL-CIO, 341 N.L.R.B.
1015, 1018-19 (2004) (adopting the ALJ’s decision to reject respondent’s position that because it was engaged mostly in state lobbying conduct, the Board should not exercise jurisdiction); Lighthouse for the Blind of Hous., 244 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1145 (1979) (showing that
the Board, moving forward, will not differentiate between nonprofit and for-profit organizations for jurisdictional analysis); Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456, 456-57 (1977)
(overruling the Board’s past determination that it should refuse jurisdiction over particular
law firms); R.I. Catholic Orphan Asylum, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 (1976) (“[T]he only basis
for declining jurisdiction over a charitable organization is a finding that its activities do not
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simply because a state or foreign entity already exerts significant
control over the employer.59 Additionally, the Board now refuses to
exclude intrastate companies that are already heavily regulated by a
state.60
The Board has authority over retail enterprises that produce an
annual gross business volume of at least $500,000 and fall within the
Board’s statutory jurisdiction.61 Based on these standards, the Board
concluded in its advisory Memo that a cannabis enterprise is within
the Board’s jurisdiction so long as it meets the Board’s monetary jurisdictional thresholds.62 The Board came to this conclusion for several reasons. First, Congress had already delegated this authority to
the Board; second, a labor dispute in the cannabis industry could
have substantial effects on interstate commerce; and finally, public
policy considerations necessitate the Board to act.63 However, the
Board’s recommendation to exercise jurisdiction raises important
questions about how to resolve an obvious conflict between the CSA
and federal labor law. This Part turns next to a detailed examination
of the NLRB Memo.

have a sufficient impact on interstate commerce to warrant the exercise of the Board’s
jurisdiction.”).
59. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7-8; see, e.g., Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad.
Charter Sch., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 10-11 (Dec. 14, 2012) (rejecting the argument that
the Board should discretionarily refuse authority over charter schools because of the significant state involvement where respondent received eighty percent public funding, where
educators were required to be certified under the state school code and participate in the
same assessments mandated of public school educators, and where respondent was subject
to various other state regulations); see also Volusia Jai Alai, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1975)
(rejecting the argument that the Board should use its discretion to decline jurisdiction over
the Jai Alai industry where the state mandated that all workers be licensed and that
eighty-five percent be citizens of the state, retained authority to accept managerial workers, and employed residents directly to maintain the integrity of the sport and the
gambling polices).
60. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 8; see, e.g., Mgmt. Training Corp., 317
N.L.R.B. 1355, 1357-58 (1995) (showing that when deciding if the NLRB should exercise
jurisdiction over an employer that has ties to a foreign government, the Board should only
determine if the employer fits under the definition of “employer” under section 2(2) of the
NLRA, and if that employer hits the monetary standards); State Bank of India, 229
N.L.R.B. 838, 842 (1977) (concluding that there is no public policy that justifies the Board
to continue to decline jurisdiction on the basis that the employer is an “agency” or “instrumentality” of an international state); cf. Temple Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher
Educ., 194 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161 (1972) (declining to assert jurisdiction where a state directly controlled a nonprofit university to the extent that the university was deemed to be a
quasi-public institution).
61. Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88, 89 (1958); see NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 8.
62. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 8.
63. Id.
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C. The NLRB Memorandum
In 2013, employees of the Wellness Connection of Maine claimed
that the cannabis-dispensing organization engaged in unfair labor
practices and conducted union-busting activities.64 The United Food
and Commercial Workers International Union (“UFCW”), which
maintains a Medical Cannabis and Hemp Division,65 petitioned the
Board to hear the case, and for the first time in U.S. history, the
Board accepted the petition.66 Yet, because the CSA renders all cannabis businesses illegal under federal law, it was unclear whether
employees of an illegal enterprise could seek redress under federal
labor laws that technically do not apply. Ultimately, the parties
agreed to a settlement, and the charges were dismissed;67 but the
Board’s Associate General Counsel Barry J. Kearney nonetheless released an Advice Memorandum detailing how the Board should regulate labor disputes in the cannabis industry.68 It is important to note
that a formal decision by the agency or a court has never been issued,
and although the Memo is persuasive authority, it does not have
force of law, nor is it binding on the Board.
The Memo addressed two concerns: (1) whether the Board
would exercise jurisdiction over an enterprise that commercially
grows, processes, and sells medical cannabis; and (2) whether the
workers, who process cannabis that has already been cultivated and
harvested by other workers, should be classified as agricultural laborers and thus not considered “employees” under section 2(3) of the
NLRA.69 The Memo first discusses the medical cannabis industry and
the difficulties employees face due to the federal prohibition of

64. Id. at 1-2.
65. See Cannabis Workers Rising, UFCW, http://cannabisworkers.org/ (last visited
Feb. 27, 2016) (showing that the UFCW maintains “Cannabis Workers Rising,” a campaign
that gives a voice to employees in the medical marijuana retail industry); see also Samuel
P. Jacobs & Alex Dobuzinskis, Marijuana Industry Provides Hope for Shrinking Labor
Unions, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2013, 12:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/02/06/marijuana-industry_n_2627699.html;
Stu Woo,
Teamsters Organize
Medical Marijuana Growers, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052748703305004575504370924866534 (last updated Sept. 21, 2010, 12:01 AM).
66. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1; see also Candice Zee, NLRB Announces Intent to Become Involved in the Commercial Marijuana Business, EMPLOYER LAB.
REL. BLOG (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.employerlaborrelations.com/2014/08/08/nlrbannounces-intent-to-become-involved-in-the-commercial-marijuana-business/.
67. Joshua Rhett Miller, Union Gripe Brings Federal Labor Agency into Marijuana
Debate for First Time, FOX NEWS (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/03/
05/federal-labor-agency-enters-medical-marijuana-debate-for-first-time.html.
68. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9.
69. Id. at 1; see National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).

298

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:287

cannabis.70 The Memo also explains, in particular, the medical
cannabis industry in Maine, as well as the business procedures of the
charged party, The Wellness Connection.71
In 2009, Maine officially legalized the use of medical cannabis for
qualified patients by passing the Maine Medical Use of Marijuana
Act.72 By 2015, cannabis had become the highest valued cash crop
industry in Maine, with an approximate value of $78 million.73
Maine’s Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) was
tasked with issuing a detailed set of rules to regulate the new industry.74 The DHHS rules require individuals interested in joining or
working for a cannabis dispensary to pass a background screening
and obtain a registry identification card.75 In addition, DHHS rules
instruct all dispensaries to establish personnel policies, procedures,
and job descriptions and to maintain a drug-free workplace policy
and employment contract policies.76
Wellness Connection of Maine, the largest medical cannabis enterprise in the state, operates four large dispensaries.77 In 2013, several Wellness Connection employees complained to management
about health and safety hazards within the dispensaries, specifically
their exposure to illegal pesticides.78 Management refused to
acknowledge the complaints.79 In response, the employees staged a
walk-out from one of Wellness Connection’s growing facilities.80 The
workers then tried to organize, alleging that Wellness Connection
retaliated against the workers because of the protest and conducted
several intrusive interrogations.81 The employees also claimed that
the Wellness Connection facilities often lacked sterility and contained a high presence of mold.82 The UFCW agreed to represent the
Wellness Connection employees and filed a claim with the Board
70. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 3-5.
71. Id. at 1-5.
72. ME. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 2421-2430 (2014).
73. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 4; Seth Koenig, Federal Prohibition of Medical Marijuana Continues to Handcuff Now-Legal Industry in Maine, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS (Sept. 6, 2013, 12:35 PM), https://bangordailynews.com/2013/09/06/health/federalprohibition-of-medical-marijuana-continues-to-handcuff-now-legal-industry-in-maine/
(stating that the signature wild blueberry industry of Maine is being surpassed by cannabis harvest).
74. See 10-144-122 ME. CODE R. §§ 1-11 (LexisNexis 2014).
75. Id. § 8.
76. Id. § 6.
77. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
78. See Koenig, supra note 73.
79. See Jamieson, supra note 12.
80. Id.
81. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1-2; Koenig, supra note 73.
82. See Jamieson, supra note 12.
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alleging that Wellness Connection engaged in unlawful surveillance,
interrogation, and retaliatory discipline and discharge, violating sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.83
Although the parties reached a settlement, the Board still made
the decision that an enterprise involved in the cannabis industry is
within the Board’s jurisdiction because (1) the Board has clear
authority to assert jurisdiction, (2) a labor dispute involving the
industry could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and
(3) policy considerations do not compel the Board to decline.84 Finally,
the Board concluded that the Wellness Connection’s processing assistants should be classified as covered “employees” as defined under
the Act.85
The first jurisdictional hurdle addressed in the Memo is the fact
that cannabis producers and distributors may intend to keep their
business operations wholly intrastate.86 However, similar to the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause,87 the Memo
suggests that any potential intrastate issue should not limit the
Board’s reach.88 The Memo explained that Wellness Connection is a
substantial enterprise, which employs over fifteen production and
processing assistants and services over 3000 of Maine’s 4500 registered cannabis customers.89 Wellness Connection purchases enough
out-of-state supplies to reach the Board’s non-retail monetary standard and “has gross revenue sufficient to meet the Board’s retail
standard.”90 The Memo went on to explain that the cannabis industry
as a whole has evolved into a large-scale economy, no longer bound
by state lines.91 The industry employs thousands of Americans, some
of whom are represented by unions and covered by collective bargaining agreements.92 Based on these facts, the Memo concluded that a

83. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1-2; see National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
84. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 8.
85. Id. at 15; see National Labor Relations Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
86. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 9.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
88. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6-9; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1, 19 (2005) (concluding that the CSA is clearly within Congress’s commerce power because
“production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has
a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that
commodity”).
89. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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labor dispute at Wellness Connection, or any other employer in the
cannabis industry, could “adversely affect out-of-state suppliers or
interstate channels of commerce.”93
The Memo noted that this was not the first time the Board would
be asserting jurisdiction in an industry already heavily regulated by
the state.94 The mere fact that the employer’s business is already
strictly regulated by the state of Maine is immaterial because the
Board’s assertion of jurisdiction can “function concurrently with state
regulation.”95 Further, just because an employer violated one federal
law “does not give it license to violate another.”96 Therefore, the
Board should exercise jurisdiction over employers in the cannabis
industry, notwithstanding the federal prohibitions.97 The Memo compared this jurisdictional policy to that of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, another federal agency that currently
exerts authority over similar cannabis enterprises that directly violate the CSA.98 Additionally, it was noted that the Board maintained
jurisdiction over companies in direct violation of the Immigrant Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) because the companies were employing illegal immigrants.99
Finally, the Memo addressed whether Wellness Connection employees should be classified as processing assistants or as agricultural laborers.100 This is an important distinction because “agricultural
laborers” will not be considered “employees” under section 2(3) of the
NLRA.101 For purposes of classification, the Memo stated that the
Board should derive the meaning of the term “agricultural laborer”
from the definition of “agriculture,” as defined under section 3(f) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”).102 In determining
whether the workers are agricultural laborers or processing assis93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 11.
97. Id. at 10.
98. Id.; see also Inspection No. 893552.015 – Wellness Connection of Maine, OSHA,
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=893552.015 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2016) (providing information about the Occupational Safety & Health Administration’s inspection of Wellness Connection).
99. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 10-11 (noting that in the immigration context, “[a]ny limitations on the Act’s applicability . . . have been strictly remedial in nature”); see, e.g., Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 47, Case No. 29-CA-25476,
at 2-4 (Aug. 9, 2011).
100. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 11.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
102. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 11; see Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) (2012); see also Bayside Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298,
300 & n.6 (1977) (noting that Congress has “tied the definition of ‘agricultural laborer’
in § 2(3) of the NLRA to § 3 of the FLSA.”).

2015]

THE WELLNESS APPROACH

301

tants, the Memo analyzed the employer’s processing operation.103 The
Memo noted that the employer’s “processing operation transforms the
cannabis plants from their raw and natural state and therefore is
more akin to manufacturing than agriculture.”104 The Memo continued to discuss how the employer’s processing functions are not subordinate to the employer’s farming operations.105 Ultimately, the
Memo found that the Wellness Center’s processing assistants are indeed statutory employees entitled to the full protection of the
NLRA.106 The Memo based this conclusion on the fact that the processing function of the company was not purely to prepare cannabis
for the market; rather, it was “a valuable part of its operation that
utilizes significant labor and equipment to transform cannabis plants
from their natural state into retail medical marijuana products.”107
For the above reasons, the Memo concluded by making two important findings. First, it is within the Board’s authority to assert
jurisdiction over the Wellness Connection, and second, the Wellness
Connection’s workers are processing assistants and therefore covered
by the Act.108
IV. THE WELLNESS APPROACH
The Wellness Approach will likely not end the debate about how—
and whether—labor laws should cover the cannabis industry. This
Part explores whether the Board should adopt the Wellness Approach going forward. The NLRA was intended to be a broad, prophylactic law.109 One of the principle rationales behind the Act was to
limit obstructions to free commerce, checking unfair labor practices
and restoring a fair balance of bargaining power in American indus-

103. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 12-13.
104. Id. at 13. The Memo’s finding does not rely on the fact that the employer made
tincture or kief when most of the claimed unfair labor practices happened. Id. at 13 n.55.
Even though tincture and kief production obviously changed the raw and natural cannabis
product, the Memo’s conclusion was based on the Wellness Center’s operations at the time
of the Board’s decision, which did not include production of tincture or kief. Id.
105. Id. at 13-15; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 780.145-147 (2014) (showing DOL regulations
listing more factors to decide whether activities are incident to or in conjunction with farming operations).
106. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 15.
107. Id.; see Camsco Produce Co., Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 905, 908 n.18 (1990) (explaining
that when a worker is engaged normally in both primary agricultural work and nonagricultural work, a limited size of nonexempt work will be “inadequate to tip the scales” to bring
the work under the protection of the Act; thus, the Board rightfully imposes a substantiality requirement in those instances).
108. NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 11, 15.
109. William R. Corbett, The Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act: Maintaining Workplace Decorum and Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23, 46
(2006).
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try.110 However, recent worker abuse in the cannabis industry clearly
demonstrates the growing need for the Board’s intervention.111 Exercising jurisdiction over cannabis enterprises meets both objectives of
the original law while ensuring cannabis employees are not abused
by their employers. Additionally, exercising jurisdiction over cannabis enterprises is consistent with the scope of other federal agencies
and brings clarity to an evolving industry.
This Part begins by establishing that extending the Board’s jurisdiction over the cannabis industry naturally follows from a principled
interpretation of the NLRA. There are at least three reasons why the
Board should exert jurisdiction and enforce federal labor laws to protect employees of the American cannabis industry: (1) the terms “employer” and “employee” as defined in the NLRA have been interpreted broadly; (2) courts will give considerable deference to the Board’s
reasonable interpretations;112 and (3) a decision to extend coverage of
the Act to such workers is consistent with the Act’s avowed purpose.
Next, this Part argues that the policy benefits of extending jurisdiction outweigh the costs.
A. The Board’s Jurisdiction Is Consistent with the NLRA
Extending NLRB jurisdiction over the cannabis industry naturally
flows from a principled interpretation of the NLRA. The broad statutory interpretation of the term “employer,” as used in section 2(2) of
the NLRA, appears to include cannabis companies.113 Subject to limited enumerated exceptions, section 2(2) broadly defines “employer”
as “any person acting as an agent of an employer.”114 The breadth of
section 2(2)’s definition is clear: the Act objectively applies to “any
person.”115 The only limitations are specific exemptions for federal,
state, and local government agencies, labor organizations, and any
person subject to the Railway Labor Act.116 Since cannabis enterprises are not among the few groups of employers expressly exempted by
Congress, they plainly come within the broad statutory definition of
110. See generally id.
111. See Jamieson, supra note 12; Beth Quimby, Pot Dispensary Workers Rally in
Portland, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/04/
06/medical-pot-workers-protest-in-portland/.
112. Here, “reasonable” means that the Board’s interpretation is supported by substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole, even if the court would have made a different choice when considering the matter under de novo review. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f)
(2012); N.L.R.B. v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Fayetteville, Inc., 258 F.3d 305
(4th Cir. 2001).
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id.; see also id. §§ 201-219 (listing sections of the FLSA and its exceptions); 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-165 (2012) (defining the Railway Labor Act and its exceptions).

2015]

THE WELLNESS APPROACH

303

“employer.”117 Excluding cannabis employers from the Act’s protections
would be inconsistent with basic tenets of statutory construction.118
In many cases, the Supreme Court has demonstrated how broadly
“employer” may be defined.119 For instance, in NLRB v. E. C.
Atkins & Co., the Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and upheld the Board’s determination that plant
guards are “employees” within the meaning of section 2(3) of the
NLRA and are therefore entitled to the full protection of the Act.120
The Court noted that Congress did not attempt “to spell out a detailed or rigid definition of . . . an employer.”121 The Court recognized
that the term “employer” is more inclusive than the technical and traditional common law definitions because the term draws “substance
from the policy and purposes of the Act, the circumstances and background of particular employment relationships, and all the hard facts
of industrial life.”122
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, the Supreme Court again rejected conventional limitations behind the term “employer.”123 In this
case, Hearst Publications, the publisher of four daily Los Angeles
newspapers, refused to bargain collectively with its newsboys.124 The
newsboys attempted to form a local union by filing a petition for certification from the Board.125 The Board concluded that the newsboys
should be considered full-time employees under the NLRA and ordered the publishers to bargain with the newsboys.126 Upon Hearst
Publication’s petition for review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s order, reasoning that the
newsboys were independent contractors rather than employees.127
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Board’s determination that the newsboys are employees covered by the Act.128 The
Court concluded that the broad language of the Act’s definitions
“leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, in
doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal classifica117. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
118. See Solis v. Cindy’s Total Care, Inc., No. 10 Civ.7242 (PAE), 2011 WL 6013844, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2011).
119. See, e.g., NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 401-03 (1947).
120. Id. at 415.
121. Id. at 403.
122. Id.
123. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944).
124. Id. at 113.
125. Id. at 114.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 114-15.
128. Id. at 113.
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tions.”129 In reviewing the legislative history of the NLRA, the Court
found that Congress did not limit the terms with definite meaning,
but rather intended to derive its meaning from the context of the
NLRA.130 Thus, the Court held that the NLRA’s terms must be interpreted broadly enough as to correct the harms that the statue aimed
to address.131
In administrating the NLRA, the Board has accrued expertise and
experience in employment relationships spanning numerous industries.132 The Supreme Court has recognized and acknowledged that
this experience puts the Board in the best position to interpret the
boundaries of the NLRA.133 Congress created the Board to administer
the NLRA and, in doing so, delegated the power to define the terms
of the Act.134 Courts should give considerable deference to the Board
and its construction of NLRA terms.135 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court is likely to uphold any reasonably defensible interpretation of
“employer” by the Board.136 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged this judicial deference in Jefferson County v.
NLRB.137 The court noted that the Board’s construction of its own
statutory jurisdiction, like determining whether unfair labor practices have been committed, should be entitled to great respect.138
Additionally, by extending the protections and coverage of the
NLRA to workers in the cannabis industry, the Wellness Approach
will be consistent with the Act’s declared purpose to:
[E]liminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association . . . for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment.139

129. Id. at 129.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 129-30.
132. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
133. See id.; Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can
We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 126 (2003).
134. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. at 130-31.
135. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. (Chi. Stamping Plant) v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496-97
(1979); NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
136. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891.
137. Jefferson Cty. Cmty. Ctr. for Developmental Disabilities v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 122
(10th Cir. 1984), overruled by Aramark Corp. v. NLRB, 179 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1999).
138. Id. at 124.
139. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
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If cannabis companies are to be excluded from federal labor laws,
then a subdivision of employers without the same legal incentives
to practice safe workplace policies as other covered employers may
place a substantial burden on commerce by “impairing the efficiency,
safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce.”140 This
potential employer subdivision is part of an industry that is fully
integrated in local, state, and national economies, employing thousands of workers who are unable to safeguard their proper interests.
Denying cannabis employees the same rights as other American
workers may eventually lead to strikes and other forms of industrial
unrest, which Congress planned to address under the NLRA.141 With
the NLRA, Congress intended to protect collective bargaining rights
by ensuring that there was no subclass of employers without a
comparable interest in minimal workplace standards as other legal
enterprises.142 The Wellness Approach will be consistent with these
core NLRA goals.
B. The Board’s Jurisdiction Makes Sense as a Matter of Policy
Not only would the Wellness Approach carry out congressional intent, but it would also create good public policy. The Wellness Approach would provide federal oversight to check unfair labor practices, restore a fair balance of bargaining power in the industry, and
promote consistency with existing federal policy.
Extending the coverage of the NLRA to workers in the cannabis
industry is consistent with the Act’s objective of protecting the rights
of employees and encouraging certain private sector management
practices that benefit the overall welfare of workers, businesses, and
the U.S. economy.143 In enacting the NLRA, Congress was cognizant
of how capitalism can create an inevitable struggle between two competing interests in the workplace.144 An employer’s profit motive will
drive them to seize as much from labor as possible, and workers often
must endure these efforts to secure their own material compensa140. Id. (noting the Act’s declaration that it is the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of obstruction to the free flow of commerce); see also NLRB. v. Jones
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 23 n.2 (1937) (quoting the language found in 29 U.S.C.
§ 51 to demonstrate the United States’ policy to eliminate causes of obstruction to the free
flow of commerce).
141. See Ellen J. Dannin, Legislative Intent and Impasse Resolution Under the National Labor Relations Act: Does Law Matter?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 11, 23 (1997) (noting the importance protecting workers collective bargaining rights through the NLRA).
142. Id.; see James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections
and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 958 (1996).
143. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111
(1944).
144. See RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
WORKPLACE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 15 (1979).
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tion.145 This struggle manifests itself across every major industry in
the United States and, if left unchecked, may significantly hamper
the free flow of commerce.146 However, the two competing interests
are not irreconcilable. An industry should seek to balance the interests of employers with the rights of its workers. Unionism, supported
by the power of strikes, can significantly improve the workers’ position via collective bargaining agreements and shop-qualified floor
representation, while also limiting employer abuse.147
Allowing the Board to exercise jurisdiction will not only restrict
unfair labor practices but will also reimpose a fair balance of bargaining power. The Wellness Approach would encourage employers to
take steps to deter workplace policies that might generate evidence
typical of unfair labor practices. Just as the NLRA successfully encouraged employers to set up fair procedures in legal industries,148
the Wellness Approach is likely to reduce instances of unfair labor
practices in the cannabis industry.
A recent conflict arising between the Compassionate Care Foundation of New Jersey and its employees manifests the inherent necessity for federal labor standards.149 When the New Jersey-based
cannabis dispensary faced financial difficulties, management told its
employees to “voluntarily” take a temporary sixty-day pay cut and
defer full payment for a later date.150 Eventually, the employees
asked management to restore their full salaries and hours.151 Management refused to acknowledge their pleas and announced that the
employees would not receive their promised back pay.152 The workers
organized and petitioned to join a labor union in hope that they could
collectively apply enough pressure to bring management to the bar145. See id. at 12.
146. Cf. id. at 15-16.
147. See id. at 16.
148. Jonathan Fox Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A Comparative Analysis of the
National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Hope for the
NLRA’s Future, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 107, 120-22 (2009) (discussing how the subsequent
limitations imposed on the NLRA diminished the motives of employers to engage in fair
labor practices). See generally JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 166 (2007).
149. See Stipulation, Compassionate Care Foundation, No. 04-RC-140751 (N.L.R.B.
Nov. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Compassionate Care Foundation] (on file with author); see also
Hefler, supra note 17; Jan Hefler, Marijuana Dispensary Workers Continue Union Effort,
PHILLY.COM (Apr. 22, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-04-22/news/61383462_1_onlymedical-marijuana-dispensary-dispensary-employees-compassionate-care-foundation.
150. Compassionate Care Foundation, supra note 149; Susan K. Livio, N.J. Medical
Marijuana Dispensary Workers Withdraw Petition to Unionize, NJ.COM (Apr. 15, 2015,
2:20 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/04/nj_medical_marijuana_dispensary_
workers_withdraw_p.html.
151. Compassionate Care Foundation, supra note 149; see Hefler, supra note 17.
152. Compassionate Care Foundation, supra note 149; see Hefler, supra note 17.
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gaining table.153 Nevertheless, the Compassionate Care Foundation
blocked the workers from joining the union and retaliated against
participating employees by cutting their hours and wages.154 Management’s response was in clear violation of multiple provisions of
the NLRA.155 To insulate itself from liability, the Compassionate Care
Foundation reclassified its employees as agricultural laborers, one of
the limited exemptions under the Act.156 Cannabis employers have
attempted to use the ambiguous legality of the industry to justify
otherwise questionable practices, leaving their employees vulnerable.
The potential for employee abuse is compounded because many
workers in the cannabis industry are the kind of low-wage, low-skill
workers most in need of labor law protections.157
Far too many companies are inclined to participate in unfair employment practices when their workers are replaceable and have no
avenue of recourse. For instance, a Seattle-based cannabis dispensary doing business as A List MMJ (“MMJ”) characterized its employees as volunteers and refused to reimburse them for their work.158
MMJ also established polices that not only prevented workers from
communicating with one another about wages, but also prevented
them from speaking to the news media about workplace conditions.159
The employees were eventually terminated after they participated in
organized activities to obtain their unpaid wages.160 In an attempt to
equalize this bargaining position, cannabis industry workers from
across the country started to organize and seek representation by
various trade groups, including the United Food and Commercial

153. Compassionate Care Foundation, supra note 149; see Hefler, supra note 17.
154. Hefler, supra note 17.
155. Compassionate Care Foundation, supra note 149; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (2012);
see also Hefler, supra note 17 (noting that Compassionate Care workers’ claims include
that their attempt to unionize was blocked, they were retaliated against when Compassionate Care lowered their hours and wages, and they were denied previously promised
back-pay after taking a voluntary sixty-day pay cut).
156. Compassionate Care Foundation, supra note 149; see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
157. Cf. Luke Scheuer, The Worst of Both Worlds: The Wild West of the “Legal” Marijuana Industry, 35 N. ILL. L. REV. 557 (2015); Jeremy B. White, California Pot Farmers Wrestle with New Medical Marijuana Rules, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 17, 2015, 10:10 AM),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article45255678.html; Cannabis Workers Rising, UFCW, http://cannabisworkers.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
158. See Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel Div. of Advice, NLRB, to Ronald K. Hooks, Reg’l Dir. Region 19, 1-2 (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://apps.NLRB.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45815370c4 [hereinafter Kearney Advice
Memorandum].
159. See Pot Dispensary Failed to Meet Retail Business Volume Jurisdictional Standard; Successor Not Liable Under Golden State: NLRB General Counsel’s Office, PRAC. L.
LAB. & EMP. (Jan. 2, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/1-553-3525?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=
#null.
160. Kearney Advice Memorandum, supra note 158, at 1.
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Workers (“UFCW”).161 The UFCW reported that the union’s newly
formed Medical Cannabis and Hemp Division now represents “thousands of medical cannabis workers” throughout the United States.162
For example, employees at Otsego-based Minnesota Medical Solutions ratified a contract under the auspices of the UFCW, Local 1189,
best known for representing supermarket employees and food processing workers.163 The UFCW has also organized cannabis workers
in other states, including California, Colorado, and Washington.164
The union represents cannabis workers involved across the entire
production chain, such as employees involved in basic horticulture,
harvesting, extraction, distribution, and retail.
Granting cannabis workers the same federal statutory protections
as other American workers creates a stronger incentive for management to review, investigate, and resolve employee grievances.165 Using the Board as a vehicle to advance cannabis labor rights will not
create more lawsuits; instead, it will foster a workplace in which lawsuits are limited. This is because labor disputes will be addressed,
not by the courts, but between two equally positioned bargaining parties, such as an employer and the employees organized as a union.166
If the Wellness Approach is enacted, it will promote coherency and
consistency of federal agency regulation. For instance, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued similar advisory memos in October 2009 and June 2011, which advised federal prosecutors that it
was not an efficient use of federal resources to prosecute “individuals
whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing
state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”167 The most
recent advisory memo, released by Deputy Attorney General James
M. Cole (“Cole Memo”), outlined the enforcement priorities of the
DOJ and how compliant cannabis enterprises might mitigate risks
161. See Jacobs & Dobuzinskis, supra note 65; see also Woo, supra note 65 (discussing
how employees of various cannabis-growing companies have recently joined the
Teamsters union).
162. Hefler, supra note 149.
163. Tom Webb, Medical Marijuana Workers Organize in Minnesota, TWINCITIES.COM
(Feb. 20, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_27566625/food-workersunion-organize-medical-marijuana-workers-minnesota.
164. Jacobs & Dobuzinskis, supra note 65.
165. EDWARDS, supra note 144, at 143.
166. Id. at 150.
167. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Selected U.S. Att’ys 1-2 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medicalmarijuana.pdf; see also Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to U.S. Att’ys 1 (June 29, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf (referring to the Ogden Memo’s stance that it is not an efficient use of federal resources to “focus enforcement efforts on individuals with cancer or
other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen
consistent with applicable state law, or their caregivers”).
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adverse to these priorities.168 The Cole Memo aims to limit federal
enforcement in states with strong regulatory infrastructures.169 The
Cole Memo underscores the agencies’ expectation that state governments will implement effective regulatory and enforcement systems
that address the threat the cannabis industry might pose to law enforcement interests, such as public health and safety.170 In February
2014, the U.S. Department of Treasury (“DOT”) also issued a memorandum giving financial institutions more leeway in accommodating
cannabis businesses.171 The stated purpose of the memo was to bring
the economic activity out of the shadows and into auditable, tractable
transactions.172
The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”) is yet another federal agency that has exercised jurisdiction and conducted investigations throughout the cannabis industry.173 The OSHA investigations and the violations discovered indicate both the risks cannabis workers face and the need for stronger
worker representation.174 Additionally, federal confidentiality laws,
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), are also constantly enforced within the industry.175 Such
enforcement emphasizes the federal government’s desire to strike a
balance between protecting the rights of cannabis employees and
regulating an illegal industry. Thus, the Wellness Approach can
bring American labor law into line and encourage consistency with
the approach taken by many other federal actors when dealing with
the cannabis industry.

168. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
All U.S. Att’ys 1-2 (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo], http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf (listing enforcement priorities as including, among other things, preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; preventing
revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels;
preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some
form to other states; and preventing state-authorized marijuana from being used as a cover
for trafficking other drugs).
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id.; see also Justice Department Announces Update to Marijuana Enforcement
Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-announces-update-marijuana-enforcement-policy.
171. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, supra note 34.
172. See id.
173. See Inspection No. 893552.015 – Wellness Connection of Maine, supra note 98.
174. See id.
175. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996); see also Joshua B. Murphy, Q&A: The Legal Implications of Medical
Marijuana, PRAC. PAIN MGMT. (June 30, 2011), http://www.practicalpainmanagement.com/
treatments/complementary/qa-legal-implications-medical-marijuana.
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V. CHALLENGES TO THE WELLNESS APPROACH
While the policy considerations for the Wellness Approach are
strong, serious challenges stand in the way. Given that the cannabis
industry runs afoul of multiple federal laws,176 some critics may prefer to dedicate regulation of the industry to the states. There are several key objections that may be raised to counter the Wellness Approach. First, extending the Board’s jurisdiction may create an unnecessary conflict with existing federal drug laws.177 Second, given
the Board’s interpretation of the nature of work in the cannabis industry, the Board may treat a broader class of workers as not falling
under the agricultural laborer exception of the NLRA. This may result in offering more protections than those given to employees in
legal industries. Ultimately, however, none of these objections are
persuasive.
The Wellness Approach may also face considerable impediments if
new cannabis regulations compromise enforcement of the CSA. The
Supreme Court has expressed concern with any agency order that
potentially interferes with existing federal law or policy.178 Since it
may be impossible for an individual to obtain employment at a cannabis company without directly or indirectly contravening federal
drug enforcement polices, the Wellness Approach may have to yield
to the federal government’s stance on Schedule I narcotics.
The main objective of the CSA, as articulated by the Supreme
Court, was to “conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances” in addition to combating
recreational drug abuse.179 The text of the CSA itself reaffirms this
purpose by stating, “Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the
traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of
the interstate incidents of such traffic.”180 Critics may argue that enforcing the NLRA with respect to the illegal cannabis industry is not
compatible with the CSA’s purpose to control the traffic of controlled
substances throughout the United States. By giving employees in the
industry the protections available to those in legal industries, the
Wellness Approach could arguably incentivize more workers to enter
into a business clearly deemed illegal by the CSA. If the courts view
the purpose of the CSA in broad terms—as deterring and prohibiting

176. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)-(c) (2012); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012).
177. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)-(c).
178. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
179. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269, 272 (2006) (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 12-13 (2005)).
180. 21 U.S.C. § 801(6) (2012).
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the use of controlled substances—then any step taken by the NLRB
to legitimize the industry may well contravene the goals of the CSA.
The Board has thus far not treated many cannabis workers as agricultural laborers, reasoning that they more closely resemble manufacturers than farm laborers because they transform a product from
its raw and natural state.181 This logic could equally apply to farm
laborers who transform any plant or animal product by processing or
butchering it.182 If the Board defines the class of agricultural workers
in the marijuana industry more narrowly, it may create another incentive for employees to enter into an industry still treated as illegal
under federal law as well as the law of a majority of states.
A. Challenges Rebuffed
The objections discussed above are not persuasive for many reasons. Fundamentally, employees should not lose basic labor protections simply because the industry runs afoul of federal law. After all,
employers are also violating the law and should not reap an unfair
bargaining advantage as a result. Moreover, any conflict between the
CSA and the NLRA is implicit and minor. Even if there were a genuine conflict, the federal government remains free to enforce the CSA
against industry participants. Enforcement is preferable to allowing
unfair labor practices to continue to go unchecked. Doing so advances
neither the purpose of the NLRA nor the purpose of the CSA. Finally,
many employees in the cannabis industry do not neatly fit within the
agricultural worker exception under the NLRA. The Board did not
give cannabis industry participants protections other workers do not
enjoy. Instead, the Board simply recognized the nature of the work
performed by some employees in the industry.
The conflict between the Board’s authority to enforce the NLRA
and the potential conflict with the CSA is analogous to an issue the
Supreme Court addressed in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB.183 In Sure-Tan,
the Court directly confronted potential conflicts between an NLRB
order and federal immigration policy.184 The Court concluded that the
Board properly interpreted the NLRA to apply to undocumented
workers because federal immigration statutes convey only a “peripheral concern” with the employment of illegal aliens.185 The Court noted that Congress did not make it a separate criminal offense for employers to hire illegal aliens or for illegal aliens to seek employment,
so there was “no reason to conclude that application of the NLRA to
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

NLRB Memorandum, supra note 9, at 13.
See id.
467 U.S. at 883.
See id.
Id. at 892 (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976)).
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employment practices affecting such aliens would necessarily conflict
with the terms” of federal immigration policy.186
The CSA states that an employer may not knowingly or intentionally manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance except as authorized by the Act.187 The CSA provides specific penalties,
both civil and criminal, for violations.188 However, the Act’s language
itself does not explicitly state how a violation is to affect the enforcement of other laws, such as the NLRA. What is to happen, for instance, when an individual is hired to work at a company whose
business plan violates provisions in the CSA? Must the individual
accept unfair wages? May the employer ignore federally mandated
labor laws? Specifically, may the employer violate those labor laws
with impunity, secure in the knowledge that the Board cannot exert
jurisdiction over it? Additionally, the CSA does not make it a separate criminal offense when individuals seek employment in the cannabis industry. Thus, there is reason to conclude that application of
the NLRA to employment practices would not necessarily conflict
with the terms of the CSA.
The fact that an employer’s business violates certain provisions of
the CSA should not shield it from violations of another statute involving significantly different considerations and legislative purposes. Whether a cannabis enterprise is participating in the illegal sale
and distribution of Schedule I narcotics in interstate commerce is a
question of defining the enterprise’s business in the framework of
national drug enforcement policies. In contrast, whether a cannabis
enterprise is withholding earned wages or engaging in unfair labor
practices is a matter of federal policy governing labor relations. Thus,
enforcing labor laws will not trivialize the CSA, nor condone or encourage future violations of the CSA.
The objection that the Board’s interpretation of the nature of work
in the cannabis industry may ostensibly offer more protections to
cannabis workers than employees in other legal industries is illusory.
While it is true that many employees in the cannabis industry do not
neatly fit within the agricultural laborer exception of the NLRA, by
analyzing the duties of employees on a case-by-case basis, the Board
will avoid extending protections not enjoyed by other workers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In states where cannabis is legal, employees in the industry are
forced to make an impossible choice—risk abuse or abandon an em186. Id. at 893.
187. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012).
188. Id. § 841(b).
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ployment opportunity. It is unlikely that voters and legislators intended to impose such a cruel predicament on cannabis workers
when enacting these state laws. The Board should provide protection
to cannabis employees who suffer from these adverse employment
issues. Doing so would further one of the fundamental purposes of
the NLRA: to promote the general welfare of employees.
At the judicial level, courts should dismiss employers’ arguments
that federal law precludes the Board’s jurisdiction. Federally recognizing fair labor conditions is not the same as federally recognizing
medical cannabis. Based on the many unsuccessful attempts to reschedule cannabis as a Schedule II drug under the CSA, it is unlikely
that the federal government will legalize medical marijuana use in
the near future;189 therefore, the Board needs to take action to ensure
that workers are afforded protection in this ever-developing industry.190 Federal agencies evaluating employment issues should glean
perspective from precedent and insights of the Board in order to ensure cannabis workers have the same protections as other working
Americans.
All actors in the cannabis industry will benefit if legal protections
for cannabis workers are enhanced. Moreover, these solutions will
best balance the competing interests of employees and their employers. Workplace policies and conditions that are illegal should remain
beyond the realm of marijuana politics. As it currently stands, all
American workers are equal, but some are less equal than others.191

189. The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws made continuous
petitions to reclassify cannabis, but the DEA consistently rejected each attempt. The most
recent rejection was in 2001. See Notice of Denial of Petition, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,038
(Apr. 18, 2001).
190. See All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 1132-33
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding the DEA administrator’s classification that cannabis is a
Schedule I narcotic); see also Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (showing a second unsuccessful petition to reconsider marijuana was filed on
Oct. 9, 2002, by the Coalition to Reschedule Cannabis), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 267 (2013)
(mem.), and cert. denied sub nom. Olsen v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 134 S. Ct. 673 (2013)
(mem.).
191. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1945) (alluding to the single commandment
displayed at the farm in Orwell’s dystopian novel: “All animals are equal but some animals
are more equal than others.”).

